Why have military historians ignored drug use in the military? by Kamieński, Łukasz
Why Have Military Historians Ignored Drug 
Use in the Military?
Historians/History 
tags: military history, drugs 
Lukasz Kamienski 
Lukasz Kamienski is the author of SHOOTING UP: A Short History of Drugs and War, published 
by Oxford University Press in March 2016. He is Associate Professor at the Faculty of International
and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.
It is striking that although drugs and intoxication are intrinsic to
warfare they are largely neglected in military history scholarship.
This may not be entirely deliberate but rather might be the result
of mind-altering substances not being recognized as an appropriate
topic in the discourse on war. The subject is given greater attention
by historians of drug use and control but this has had remarkably
little influence on military historians who rarely, if ever, mention
intoxicants, and when they do, it’s merely anecdotally.
Do students of military history learn, for example, about the Zulu
warriors  who  posed  a  daunting  challenge  to  the  British  forces
during  the  Anglo-Zulu  war  of  1879  not  only  because  of  their
courage  and  ferocity  but  also  due  to  their  extensive  use  of
pharmacopeia? Or are they aware that the German blitzkrieg of
1939-1941 would have not been as fast and perhaps as successful had the Wehrmacht soldiers not
been heavily fueled by methamphetamine? 
Some might argue that intoxication is a background issue, but it is one of the realities of combat and
at  times of considerable tactical  importance.  Recognition of the role  that  drugs  have played in
armed conflicts adds a new perspective to our understanding of war. It may not profoundly change
the accepted interpretations  but can shed new light  on what  Paul  Kennedy called a “war from
below” – that is the individual soldiers’ experience of battle.
I see three main reasons why the history of drugs in war remains largely an untold story. First,
because well until the mid-20th century the use of psychoactive substances – including alcohol,
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine – for medicinal purposes was common and did
not generate controversy. There was also substantially little discussion about dependence among
soldiers who became addicted in the course of their medical treatment or about the military’s use of
drugs that blurred the line between therapy and enhancement.
Second, as a rule the military’s employment of intoxicants was kept covert. Secrecy was vitally
important when commanders distributed drugs to improve troop combat effectiveness in order for
them to gain a tactical advantage over the adversary. The same was even truer when substances
were used (or attempted to be used) as a weapon – either to subvert the enemy (by supplying drugs
to  undermine  its  fighting  power  and  morale)  or  incapacitate  it  (by  attacking  with  non-lethal
psychochemical agents). 
Since the 20th century, secrecy has also been the norm because of uneasiness with the very practice
of drugging the ranks. The development of deliberate state policies of proscribing mind-altering
substances, which dates back to the 1910s and 1920s (e.g. the U.S. Harrison Act of 1914), made the
approved use of drugs amongst militaries increasingly taboo. Certainly, a government that penalizes
the use of controlled compounds might want to keep their circulation of drugs in the military hushed
up.  The  issue  is  awkward  because  while  citizens  are  prohibited  from using  these  substances,
soldiers are not only permitted their use but, in fact, are required to take them. This double standard
– call it hypocrisy – has been conveniently masked by secrecy which in turn spilled over to the field
of military history.
Third, it is unsettling for a state to concede that such powerful forces as patriotism, nationalism, or
religion  may often  not  be sufficient  in  committing men to combat.  In  the  1980s John Keegan
offered a simple but concise answer to the question “why soldiers fight” by listing three factors:
“inducement, coercion, and narcosis.” The first, a “positive motivation,” is achieved mostly through
socialization to military life and building primary group bonds (thus men fight first and foremost for
their companions), the feeling of vocation, ideology that gives a deeper sense of purpose, good
leadership, as well as recognition and rewards. The second factor, a “negative motivation,” includes
training,  discipline  and  drill,  obedience  to  authority,  dishonor,  and  sanctions.  Still,  soldiers
frequently need an additional (chemical) motivator to inspire their courage, increase strength and
endurance, reduce stress and fatigue, and induce relaxation.
What  I  find  really  astonishing  is  that  research  on  combat  motivation  largely  disregards  the
pharmacological factor. Take as an example the rich scholarship available on the motivation of the
British  Eight  Army prior  to  the  battle  of  El  Alamein  in  1942.  Studies  commonly  explain  the
improved morale  and combat  performance of  the troops by the dynamic leadership of General
Bernard Montgomery, who raised spirits through propaganda, better discipline and training, and
new supplies of weapons. But why do they totally ignore the fact that Montgomery distributed
100,000 amphetamine pills for the attack launched on October 23?
The field of a “new military history” has gone beyond narrow analysis of battlefield reality to focus
more on the interplay between war and society. What for a long time has been neglected is now
considered an increasingly significant aspect of military history – be it environment, epidemiology,
medicine, or sex. I would contend that it is also time to incorporate intoxicants into the scholarship.
They are, after all, a legitimate subject of not only a “history of the military” but also “military
history” proper.
